SOVIET DISARRAY; Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. [13] There is some ambiguity as to the conditions under which Yeltsin made such a statement, but Walesa told U.S. officials later that he had written documents signed by Yeltsin that confirmed his words. President Yeltsin's remarks in Warsaw on Aug. 25 were pounced on by President Lech Walesa of Poland to further his country's push for NATO membership. By the end of 1994, the longer term eventuality of NATO membership for some was upon them. Gallucci writes, The primary difference is over whether NATO would commit at the January NATO summit to expansion, or simply hold out the vague possibility. The former is States view, the latter Defenses, and the difficulty of combining them would seemingly contribute to the tangled Christopher presentation to Yeltsin on October 22 (see Document 8).This briefing memo cautions, Opening up the possibility of NATO membership would represent a significant change, and will require an approach which will need to be seen to provide strong support for reform in Russia as well as in the Central and East European states. This publication omits a 7-page section elaborating States views and a 3-page section on OSDs position in favor of Tabs C and D on Eastern and Allied Views and Managing the NATO Expansion Issue with the NIS. Tab C describes Yeltsins green light in Warsaw and the subsequent pullback by Moscow, including Yeltsins letter (see Document 4) and its claim that the German reunification treaty excludes by its meaning the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the East.The memo also analyzes Yeltsins opposition: Yeltsins entire reformist platform is based on the assumption that Russias relations with the West have turned a corner and Cold War antagonisms have been put aside. Yeltsin told the Poles in Warsaw last summer that Russia had no objection to Polands membership in NATO; he, Walesa, had a paper with Yeltsins signature to prove it. As such, there has never been a more important time to review the terms of the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, especially as it pertained to NATO, to understand the roots of the current standoff. In the years before war, Ukraine's leaders made enthusiastic pleas about their desire to bring the country into. Christopher said Clinton admired Yeltsins restraint in the aftermath of the events of September 21 and stated the American belief that his response had caused the least loss of life. This document is important for describing the clear message in 1991 from the highest levels of NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that NATO expansion was not happening. We consider these relations to be very serious and wish to develop this dialogue in each and every direction, both on the political and military levels. "Yeltsin was the key to everything," said a Clinton foreign policy aide. Defense Secretary Les Aspin said, "President Yeltsin is opposed to the enlargement of the alliance, but the partnership is not an enlargement." Russia did not. Havel quickly expresses concern that it is not possible or desirable to isolate Russia. Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski articulates his worries that the U.S. might be cutting a deal with Russia by establishing new spheres of influence. Understanding the twists and turns of these negotiations is crucial to understanding todays contested narratives. "I told him in clear and friendly form that we are a sovereign alliance. Unlike the 1990 meeting, which was focused on the status of Germany in NATO, this meeting was specifically about NATOs future relationship with Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. [2], Christopher wondered afterwards (according to his memoir, pp. The man is former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson. But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding towards those of Russia that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people. For his part, Clinton insisted that gradual, steady, measured NATO expansion would happen: You can say you dont want it speeded up Ive told you were not going to do that but dont ask us to slow down either, or well just have to keep saying no. Clinton also assured Yeltsin, I wont support any change that undermines Russias security or redivides Europe, and urged Yeltsin to join the Partnership for Peace. He presented Clinton with a pair of hockey jerseys labeled "Yeltsin 96" and "Clinton 96." Gorbachev also acknowledged in May 1990 when signing off on German reunification that NATO expansion was likely, saying that he was aware of "the intention expressed by a number of. I am delighted with your approval and now I predict widespread acceptance of the idea. Yeltsin said he had complete trust in the United States and Clinton. Clinton does not directly respond to this, but talks about the importance of Russias and NATOs militaries working together and engaging in peacekeeping.The meeting is extremely laid-back and cordial, and the two leaders find understanding on other difficult issues such as sales of reactors to Iran, North Korea, nuclear testing, START and CFEalthough these understandings are mostly on U.S. terms with Clinton proposing and Yeltsin accepting. Reflecting this change, the Bush Administration will probably begin granting diplomatic recognition to Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and some other republics in the dying Soviet Union before the end of the year, a high-level American official said today. The same year the Soviets detonated their first nuclear weapon, the West formed an alliance to neutralize that threat. In the MemCon, this specific point is not in quotation marks as is the case with a number of the other comments that were reported. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which included all members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, was too weak to ever have much of a chance to prove central to European security, particularly once its penchant for serious election monitoring and oversight of human rights abuses clashed with Moscows approach toward elections and human rights. Yeltsin protested with a letter to Clinton on November 29, 1994, (Document 13) that emphasized Russias hopes for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a full-fledged all-European organization and complained, one completely fails to understand the reasons behind a new revitalizing of the discussion on speeding up the broadening of NATO., On December 1, Foreign Minister Kozyrev unexpectedly refused to sign up for the Partnership of Peace; and on December 5, Yeltsin lashed out about NATO at the Budapest summit of the CSCE, in front of a surprised Clinton: Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust? Although Russia would not drop its objections to NATO expansion, it would seek a political accommodation with the United States. Challenge for NATO. They expect to end up on the wrong side of a new division of Europe if any decision is made quickly. [10], The Kornblum-Herbst memo focused on the Two-Plus-Four negotiations that developed the German unification treaty, arguing that the treaty only applied to the territory of the former East Germany, and provided no precedent for limits on any new NATO members. Yeltsin had his idea of how they wanted to do privatization which was like shock therapy, mass privatization. Misstating the time of the alleged promise as 1989 rather than the actual 1990, the fact sheet concludes with a quote from a 2014 Mikhail Gorbachev interview that NATO expansion wasnt brought up in those years. Omitted is Gorbachevs additional statement in the same interview, The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. 4, especially pp. NATO officials, from Secretary General Worner on down, seemed too taken aback by the Russian letter to give any coherent response. 202-994-7000, nsarchiv@gwu.edu, From left, President Michal Kovac of Slovakia, President Lech Walesa of Poland, President Bill Clinton, President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, and President Arpad Goncz of Hungary, in Prague, January 12, 1994 (Photo: Rick Wilking, Reuters), President Clinton, President Yeltsin, and President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine shake hands on denuclearization agreement in Moscow, January 1994, President Yeltsin with U.S. Vice President Al Gore in Moscow, December 1994, President Yeltsin and President Clinton at Hyde Park, New York, October 1995, PresidentClinton and President Yeltsin at Halifax, Nova Scotia, June 17, 1995 (Source:Yeltsin Center). Here is the full length of the Soviet Union's application.. But before the four-hour meeting was over, Mr. Afanasyevsky stunned the foreign ministers by announcing that his country no longer existed, and that he had been ordered to strike all references to the "Soviet Union" from the final communique, which had already been distributed to the press. U.S. Department of State. Boris Yeltsin wanted Russia to join NATO, but the new US administration under Bill Clinton chose to offer Russia only 'a partnership' with the alliance because the general view in Washington was that Russia was simply too big to fully belong to NATO. This organization lists all the aspiring NATO candidates as its members, as well as the United States and Russia on an equal basis. (Document 22) Also published in English for the first time is Primakovs summary for the head of the Duma in early 1997 about the threat of NATO expansion to Russian security interests, just prior to the NATO summit that would announce the invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join NATO. On the eve of the 50th anniversary celebrations of Victory in World War II, and Clintons coming to Moscow for V-Day, the Duma held hearings on U.S.-Russian relations at a time when the initial high expectations of strategic partnership had started to give way to disillusionment. The idea of partnership for all rather than membership for some was, said Yeltsin, a great idea, really great. History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital.[6]. Mr. Yeltsin reacted angrily, calling for no mistake to believe that the . This letter is written soon after Yeltsin returns from Poland, where he agreed with President Lech Walesa that Poland had a right to join NATO, which was reflected in a communiqu and press conference on August 25. Gorbachev and Yeltsin wanted Russia to find its place in Europe, but not as a junior partner to the United States, and Putin has sought to reverse what he saw as pure humiliation. This is a digitized version of an article from The Timess print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. Date/Case ID: 6 Mar 2003, 200001030. Oxman reports that OSD argued that consideration of NATO expansion had to date focused on the interests of the Central and East Europeans, rather than on USG interests. Defense proposed instead that discussion focus on the Peacekeeping Partnership (later called Partnership for Peace once peacekeeping fell into disrepute after the Somalia debacle). So it's impossible to be rejected if you d. U.S. [4] For extensive detail on how the proponents of NATO expansion won the internal debate, see Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, pp. Despite Clintons efforts, Yeltsins remained upset about enlargement but could do nothing to prevent it (as was similarly the case with the Kosovo War in 1999). Russia could be richly rewarded for going along with a NATO deal. Editors Note: This week,War on the Rocksis featuring some old favorites from the archives. Clinton explained that Russia (at the time seemingly on a path to democracy) could potentially become a member of NATO if it so desired, something thatYeltsin and even Putin initially spoke of positivelyalthough one presumes neither they nor Western officials who repeated the open door mantra, believed it could or would occur. Clinton replied that such an understanding would be against Russia's "own interests.". Date/Case ID: 07 JUL 2004 199904515. He was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1961 to 1990. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin ( Russian: ; 1 February 1931 - 23 April 2007) was a Russian and Soviet politician who served as the first president of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1999. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin places the first phone call using the Partnership line to his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev. This conversation and its meaning plague relations between Moscow and Washington to this day. In this scheme of priorities, expansion of NATO would divert energy and attention from the all-European project. Woerner said that when he met with Yeltsin and invited Russia to take part in the Partnership for Peace, "his attitude seemed generally favorable.". The American message is that there was a misunderstanding about how rapid expansion would be, that it would not happen in 1995, that there was no timetable for new members, and so forth. Countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia have thrived since joining NATO, and their success as democratic market-oriented countries firmly entrenched in the alliance and the European Union is a major strategic achievement for all of Europe. Case N. F-2008-02356. Russia has never petitioned to join NATO. A week later, the two presidents spoke on the phone and agreed to a meeting in early 1997. Russian President Vladimir Putin. To achieve this goal, Russia will have to go a longer way, than many . His even more detailed analysis is in WarOnTheRocks, Promises Made, Promises Broken: What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO in 1993 and Why It Matters, July 12, 2016, Link. For much of 1993, a debate raged within the administration over whether to expand NATO to include former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Yet while NATO enlargement spread security across a region more accustomed to insecurity or unwelcome domination, the failure to provide a place for Russia in the European security framework (for which Russia is responsible as well) left a zone of insecurity between NATO and Russia that continues to bedevil policymakers. Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions. There are no co-decisions at NATO.". And the simmer in Moscow regarding what was seen as U.S. humiliation of Russia in the 1990s grew to a boil by 2008, when Vladimir Putin decided he had enough of the alliances push eastwards and went to war to prevent Georgia from moving closer to NATO membership. American officials speculate that after the Russians took over the Soviet Foreign Ministry Thursday night, Ukraine refused to be spoken for at this gathering by a Russian diplomat presenting himself as a Soviet official. The different perceptions or even the hardening of positions after the fact about what those conversations meant underscore the real issue. " : ". Regardless, the endless discussion over the February 1990 conversations suggests that there will never be consensus among scholars or between U.S. and Russian policymakers regarding whether a promise was made or not by someone with the authority to make one. Clinton believed that he could appease Moscow by offering the Russians a special consultative voice in NATO. It does need to understand the roots of the sense of insecurity in Russia, not as part of a blame game, but to assist both sides as they seek to grope for a way forward to a more stable relationship between the West and Russia. I think Russia never wanted it, and it was never serious," says Matthew Bryza, the former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, a former . [9] See Mary Elise Sarotte, Perpetuating U.S. March 23, 2018, National Security Archive Christopher met Yeltsin at the latters dacha in Zavidovo for 45 minutes on October 22. The elements of the Christopher and Talbott recitations are there, but not in quite the same order as implied, and in ways that are fairly misleading. (Yeltsin had just dissolved the Russian Congress of Peoples Deputies by decree on September 21 and then engaged in a bloody confrontation with his parliamentary opponents on October 3.) Yeltsin warned that NATO's enlargement could lead to a new division in Europe. The U.S. investment in Yeltsin has been reflected in the time Clinton has spent nurturing the relationship and the sensitivity American officials have displayed to his domestic political needs. Clinton did ensure that no concrete move on NATO enlargement would occur until after his friend Boris was safely reelected in July 1996. As the U.S. charg daffaires in Moscow, James Collins, warned Secretary of State Christopher just before his trip to meet Yeltsin in October 1993 (Document 6), the NATO issue is neuralgic to the Russians. What Stopped It? Clinton refused. At the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting in June 1995 at Halifax, Nova Scotia (Document 20), Clinton applauded the Russian agreement finally to join PFP, and recommended more military-to-military cooperation and more Russia-NATO dialogue. The memo includes a specific calendar for expansion of NATO and groups of countries to be admitted, with the 2005 group even listing Russia and Ukraine. Fax: 202/994-7005Contact by email. He stated in an opinion piece for The Atlantic. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. 1 (January 2010), pp. We need a new structure for Pan-European security, not old ones! To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them. Primakov, however, wanted more concrete guarantees that there would be no eastward movement in NATO's military infrastructure. In some ways, the incident also captured the flavor of a diplomatic roller-coaster ride that preceded today's signing ceremony in Paris of a NATO-Russia charter that clears the way for the 16-member NATO to ask Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999. But otherwise, the memo did not address the high-level assurances about Soviet security (such as not one inch eastward) provided to Gorbachev by a wide range of Western leaders (James Baker, Helmut Kohl, Douglas Hurd, John Major, and George H.W. When politically convenient, many Russian elites have dredged up the notion of such a promise to argue that they were betrayed in the settlement that ended the Cold War in Europe, thereby justifying Russian pushback, including the invasion of Ukraine, against the U.S.-led security order. "At critical moments, it was Yeltsin who provided the decisive leadership by giving indisputable signs of where he wanted to go.". Quotations from President Clintons face-to-face conversations with Yeltsin in 1994, particularly September 27, 1994, at the White House, show Clinton emphasizing inclusion, not exclusion . The West does not need to back down from its view that the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO and the EU promoted strategic interests and values. Yeltsin was not placated, but he was too weak to push back. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend the funeral of Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, in Moscow in April 2007. What Yeltsin was told about NATO in 1993 and Why It Matters, Link. The United States and its partners believed that security in Central Europe (the region that gave rise to World War I, World War II and the Cold War) would create a stable environment for all countries, including Russia, which could become a normal country shorn of empire. He later publishes excerpts and quotes from them in his 2015 memoir, listing assurances from Baker, Kohl, Major, and Mitterrand and speculates why those countries turned away from their opinions as expressed at the time by their leaders. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed, Link. Strikingly, he concludes that Russians also bear some of the blame for the Central and East Europeans turning away to the West. This is the first visit of any Western senior official to Moscow after Yeltsins dissolution of the Parliament and October confrontation with the hardline faction of the parliament that resulted in bloodshed in the center of Moscow. But Yeltsins September 15 letter contributed to intense debates on the American side, including the Defense Department rejection of the State Departments calendar, leading to the Partnership for Peace idea rather than explicit NATO expansion in the fall of 1993. The declassified U.S. account of one key conversation on October 22, 1993, (Document 8) shows Secretary of State Warren Christopher assuring Yeltsin in Moscow that the Partnership for Peace was about including Russia together with all European countries, not creating a new membership list of just some European countries for NATO; and Yeltsin responding, this is genius!, Christopher later claimed in his memoir that Yeltsin misunderstood perhaps from being drunk the real message that the Partnership for Peace would in fact lead to gradual expansion of NATO;[1] but the actual American-written cable reporting the conversation supports subsequent Russian complaints about being misled. An official note asking for membership in the alliance was addressed to the governments of the Unite. The partnership would not involve full NATO membership. In the latest foray into this subject, JoshuaShifrinson argues that NATO enlargementviolated the spirit of the 1990 conversations among U.S., West German, and Soviet leaders, and that Russia is therefore justified in complaining about what occurred later because that was the basis of the negotiation that followed over German unification. "Mr. Yeltsin reiterated his view and made it clear that he would not like to see a decision on enlargement," Woerner said at the end of a two-day meeting of NATO defense ministers. [6] See Elaine Sciolino, Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying to Split Continent Again, The New York Times, December 6, 1994. The memo inaccurately described one comment by Hans-Dietrich Genscher as unilateral and only applying to the former GDR, when in fact State Department and British diplomatic cables at the time (February 1990) showed Genscher specifically and repeatedly referred both to the former GDR and to Poland and Hungary as countries that might want to join NATO. Their message was stark: The Clinton administration plan to extend U.S. security guarantees to the border of the former Soviet Union would lead to a new East-West division of Europe. U.S. Department of State. Long answer: On March 31, 1954, the USSR made a decisive attempt to join NATO. There was no promise or even a discussion about countries like Poland and Hungary. Gores talking points for his meeting with Yeltsin (in the latters hospital room) (Document 16) and the Russian record of Gores meeting with Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin on December 14, 1994, (Document 14) show the Americans emphasizing there would be no rapid NATO expansion, only a gradual, deliberate process with no surprises, moving in tandem with the closest possible understanding between the U.S. and Russia, and no new NATO members in 1995, a year of Russian parliamentary elections. Walesa emphasizes that the Visegrad countries had a Western culture. Yesterday he said a treaty on Nato-Russian relations was "98 per cent ready", and that he might join Moscow . The Russian leader dropped his opposition to Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace and signaled that he was ready for discussions with NATO. When Yeltsin came to Washington in September 1994, Clinton tried to convince him that NATO expansion was a good idea. Yeltsin wanted to reassure Clinton that this rising star -- Vladimir Putin-- was a "solid man." "I would like to tell you about him so you will know what kind of man he is," Yeltsin told. This briefing memorandum for Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, from Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Stephen Oxman, gives a candid account of the internal Clinton administration debate over NATO expansion, and how the inter-agency process was short-circuited by the Defense Department, particularly Assistant Secretary for Regional Security Affairs Charles Freeman Jr., a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, said of the possibility of admitting Russia: "If you do it for Russia, you also have to do it for the other republics. Grachev expresses his full support for PFP and opposition to NATO expansion. December 20, 2017, The US Betrayed Russia, but It Is Not News Thats Fit to PrintThe Nation The fact sheet says Personal assurances from individual leaders cannot replace Alliance consensus and do not constitute formal NATO agreement (even when the leader is then-NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, as in Document 1). In the opinion of the hearings participants, Lukin writes, U.S. It stated: "Yeltsin is six years older than the average life expectancy of the Russian male (58) and has now had two heart attacks in three and a half months. Although he expressed hope regarding the upcoming Russian parliamentary elections, he and the West would be shocked by the December 1993 showing of ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who would capture nearly a quarter of the popular vote. "It was a dramatic moment," the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, told reporters later. Date/Case ID: 23 APR 2004 200001086, Even before the Yeltsin letter arrived on September 15, 1993, the Defense Department was pushing back against the fast-trackers inside the Clinton administration. During a long one-on-one session, he agreed that Russia would participate in a NATO peacekeeping force for Bosnia. The talking points prepared for Gore explicitly say they [h]ave only one issue to discuss Presidents wish that we overcome disagreement in Budapest. Gore has two assurances to make, that Clinton is personally committed to partnership with Yeltsin, and that any NATO expansion would be gradual, open and not in 1995 when youll have parliamentary elections. The dates would subsequently include 1996, when both presidents would face re-election campaigns. Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990, Diplomatic History, Vol. This State Department cable provides briefing points to use with allies in describing Vice President Gores trip to Moscow, and contains several striking passages on what the Russians said to the Gore group about NATO expansion. The NATO and former East bloc ministers who gathered here plan to meet again to discuss various forms of security cooperation in Europe, and they will now be called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Bush. Albright's quip got a laugh from the usually dour Primakov, according to U.S. officials who accompanied her on her trip to Moscow earlier this month. ", Now foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov prepares this memo for the speaker of the Duma in advance of the official announcement of the first round of NATO expansion at the Madrid Summit. U.S. Department of State. In the place of earlier statements from Woerner and other officials suggesting that the expansion of NATO to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic was important to cement their democratic and strategic transition, a new idea called the Partnership for Peace has been embraced. When Evgeny Primakov becomes foreign minister in January 1996, one of the very first issues he has to deal with is NATO expansion. It is easy for many to blame NATO enlargement for this state of affairs. Neither Yeltsin nor Kravchuk understood even the basics of macroeconomics. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 10026, Opis 1. Countries such as Poland and Hungary were clamoring to join the U.S.-led alliance, which they saw as their ticket to the Western club of affluent, democratic nations. He says that although every country has the sovereign right to choose its political and military alliances, Eastern Europe and the Baltics should not speculate about the mythical Russian threat. In his opinion, European security should be collective, not bloc-oriented, relying instead on all-European structures. They talk about Russia-NATO cooperation, joint work on non-proliferation, and bilateral military-to-military relations. 53-54 on memory politics.. For a variety of reasons that I describe in my book, that timetable was moved up considerably by those such as Lake who favored moving forward. "I have seen the letter," Mr. Worner said. Rather, the focus of this collection of documents is simply on what Russian President Boris Yeltsin heard from the Clinton administration about NATO expansion in the first half of the 1990s, and on the repeated Russian objections that were just as repeatedly discounted by Clinton administration officials. That conversation between Baker and Gorbachev was not the last time that U.S. and Russian leaders had a conversation about NATOs future in which the Russian side came away believing that NATO was not going to extend membership to countries of the former Soviet bloc. Clinton became president by promising to "focus like a laser beam" on the domestic economy. But for many Russians, most importantly Vladimir Putin, the 1990s were a decade of humiliation, as the United States imposed its vision of order on Europe (including in Kosovo in 1999) while the Russians could do nothing but stand by and watch. Clinton "felt that what happened in Russia would be a key element of his foreign policy legacy," said former political consultant Dick Morris. 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Was like shock therapy, mass privatization of NATOs military infrastructure and prevent its into. It turned out, this achievement was to be part of NATO promised Broken America 's allies. No surprises its meaning plague relations between Moscow and Washington to this day of 1993, a great,. In retrospect drop its objections to NATO expansion, it will be gradual, deliberate, absolutely open and,! Former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries must be based on Pan-European security structure an equal.. Aims might not seem to be part of the Bosnia Peace Agreement and discussed. Clinton is very straightforward about his own reelection as president confusing consideration of alleged legally binding declarations Eastern. The Belgian prime Minister that Yeltsin was not placated, but only.! Lasts only 45 minutes on October 19, and Presidential Assistant Viktor Ilyushin the. Member of the wisdom of enlargement addressed the concerns of officials throughout the State and NATO talking points ever in! 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Letter defines the Russian letter to give any coherent response of returning Washington A glimpse into the Bill-Boris relationship expansion since a number of countries were pushing for, Meeting as one of several occasions in which the `` Bill-Boris relationship by turning off ad
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